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993 
SHAKE AND BAKE: THE METH THREAT AND 
THE NEED TO RETHINK 21 U.S.C. § 841(C)(2) 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (the ―pseudoephedrine statute‖) imposes a prison 
term of up to twenty years for any person who ―distributes a listed 
chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the listed 
chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance.‖
1
 Federal 
courts of appeals have spent the last decade deciphering how to interpret 
the statutory phrase ―reasonable cause to believe,‖ specifically in cases 
involving the sale of pseudoephedrine by pharmacy or convenience store 
workers that ends up in the hands of methamphetamine producers.
2
 Some 
circuit decisions have analyzed the phrase in question using a subjective 
test, looking ―through the lens of [a] particular defendant‖ to determine 
whether he had reasonable cause to believe that a sale of pseudoephedrine 
would lead to methamphetamine production;
3
 others decry such an 
analysis as ―redundant‖ and instead use ―an objective mens rea 
requirement.‖
4 
This Note examines the pseudoephedrine statute and discusses whether 
a circuit split regarding its wording, as well as changing methods of 
methamphetamine production, warrants a rewriting of the statute. Due to 
improved efficiency in methamphetamine production methods and a 
growing domestic production market, pharmacy and convenience store 
workers are increasingly at risk of serving customers who purchase 
pseudoephedrine for methamphetamine production.
5
 Depending on which 
federal circuit court(s) can claim jurisdiction over such sales of 
 
 
 1. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (2006). Nota bene, the pseudoephedrine statute applies to chemicals 
other than pseudoephedrine and controlled substances other than methamphetamine, but this Note 
focuses on its application to pseudoephedrine sales and methamphetamine production. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802(34)(K) (2006) (defining pseudoephedrine as a ―list I chemical‖); 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2006) 
(providing a schedule of controlled substances, including methamphetamine).  
 2. See infra notes 39–111 and accompanying text. The scope of this Note is limited to the 
application of the pseudoephedrine statute to sales of pseudoephedrine by convenience store and 
pharmacy workers only. Although the language of the statute does encompass the sale of 
pseudoephedrine by an individual not associated with a pharmacy or convenience store, this Note 
looks primarily to circuit cases involving store workers because such cases have formed the substance 
of the circuit split. See id.  
 3. United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 4. United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005). See infra note 68 and 
accompanying text. Mens rea refers to the ―state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, 
must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime . . . .‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (3d 
pocket ed. 2006). A person may commit an act that falls under a certain criminal statute, but the act is 
often not criminal unless the person also possessed a ―guilty mind‖ at the time he committed the act. 
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 115 (3d ed. 2001). 
 5. See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
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pseudoephedrine, cases with similar facts may end up with very dissimilar 
outcomes as a result of circuits interpreting the scienter standard of the 
pseudoephedrine statute differently.  
Part I of this Note provides a background of methamphetamine issues 
within the United States today. Part II explores the circuit split 
surrounding the scienter requirements of the pseudoephedrine statute. Part 
III examines the language of the statute and compares it to other similarly 
worded statutes in order to find the congressional intent behind such 
wording. Part IV analyzes how to revise the pseudoephedrine statute to 
achieve the goals of Congress and create a more reasonable system for 
enforcing the statute against pharmacy and convenience store workers. 
Ultimately, this Note looks for an alternative solution that will resolve the 
circuit inconsistency and address the changing nature of methamphetamine 
production. This Note argues for removing ―reasonable cause to believe‖ 
from the statute, while simultaneously establishing a strict liability offense 
when pseudoephedrine products are sold in quantities over current legal 
limits as set by Congress in the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act 
of 2005 (the ―Combat Meth Act‖),
6
 and strengthening the standard of 
scienter required to convict store clerks who sell pseudoephedrine 
products in quantities within such limits. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Methamphetamine is a highly addictive stimulant produced and abused 
in significant quantities within the United States.
7
 In fact, 
methamphetamine ―is second only to alcohol and marijuana as the drug 
used most frequently in many Western and Midwestern states.‖
8
 As a 
result of the neurotransmitter dopamine being released within the brain, 
methamphetamine users who smoke or inhale the drug experience a ―brief, 
intense sensation,‖ while those who snort or ingest it report a ―long-lasting 
 
 
 6. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 
256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 7. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Methamphetamine, GET SMART ABOUT DRUGS, http:// 
www.getsmartaboutdrugs.com/drugs/methamphetamine.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) [hereinafter 
Methamphetamine]. 
 8. News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 34 Arrested in Northwest Indiana Alleged 
Methamphetamine Distribution Ring (June 26, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/news 
rel/chicago063008.html. According to the United Nations, survey data of cannabis, opiates, and 
cocaine indicate that such markets are in decline; ―[i]n contrast, there are several indications that the 
global problem with amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) is worsening.‖ UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON 
DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2009, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2009), available at http:// 
www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2009/Executive_summary_LO-RES.pdf. 
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high.‖
9
 In either case, prolonged methamphetamine use can result in 
serious health problems, including memory loss, aggression, psychosis, 
cardiac damage, malnutrition, dental problems, and death in the event of 
overdose.
10
 In addition to severe physical and psychological injuries 
experienced by humans as a result of methamphetamine use, 
methamphetamine production is responsible for substantial environmental 
damage—between five and seven pounds of toxic waste are created for 
every one pound of methamphetamine produced.
11
 Fumes from 
methamphetamine labs are so toxic that they can produce cancer, brain 
damage, and respiratory injuries.
12
 Methamphetamine‘s toxicity results 
from its chemical ingredients—including freon, acetone, brake cleaner, 
drain cleaner, battery acid, and cold medicine containing 
pseudoephedrine—which are heated into a volatile combination.
13 
Most of the methamphetamine used in the United States is produced in 
so-called ―superlabs,‖ but some manufacturers create the product in 
smaller clandestine laboratories.
14
 In 2009 alone, the Drug Enforcement 
 
 
 9. Methamphetamine, supra note 7. Neurons are cells within the nervous system that 
communicate information with one another via electrical and chemical signaling; neurotransmitters are 
secreted by neurons to help achieve rapid, precise communication. Zach W. Hall, The Cells of the 
Nervous System, in AN INTRODUCTION TO MOLECULAR NEUROBIOLOGY 1, 2 (Zach W. Hall ed., 1992). 
The extent of signal processing between neurons is significant—for example, scientists estimate that a 
motor neuron in a mammal‘s spinal cord handles signals from more than ten thousand other neurons. 
Id. ―Dopamine is involved in motivation, the experience of pleasure, and motor function, and is a 
common mechanism of action for most drugs of abuse.‖ NAT‘L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
METHAMPHETAMINE ABUSE AND ADDICTION 4 (2006), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/ 
RRMetham.pdf.  
 10. Methamphetamine, supra note 7. ―As with similar stimulants, methamphetamine most often 
is used in a ‗binge and crash‘ pattern. Because the pleasurable effects of methamphetamine disappear 
even before the drug concentration in the blood falls significantly—users try to maintain the high by 
taking more of the drug.‖ NAT‘L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 9, at 3. 
 11. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, PRODUCT NO. 2010-Q0317-001, 
NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2010, at 7 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf [hereinafter THREAT 2010]. Methamphetamine production is extremely 
dangerous due to the volatility of the chemicals used in production—―[a]pproximately 15 percent of 
meth labs are discovered as a result of a fire or explosion.‖ Karen Swetlow, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Children at Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs: Helping Meth’s Youngest Victims, OVC 
BULL., June 2003, at 4, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/children/ 
197590.pdf.  
 12. Marilyn Berlin Snell, Welcome to Meth Country, SIERRA, Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 50, 52, 
available at http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200101/meth.asp. In addition to human injuries caused by 
methamphetamine fumes, Snell‘s article also mentions the lethal effects that the fumes can have on 
trees in the vicinity of a methamphetamine lab. Id. at 53–54. 
 13. Environmental Impacts of Methamphetamine, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/meth_environment.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).  
 14. NAT‘L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 9, at 1. ―Superlabs‖ are defined by the National 
Drug Intelligence Center as ―clandestine laboratories capable of producing 10 or more pounds of 
methamphetamine per production cycle.‖ NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, 
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Administration (DEA) reported 10,064 ―meth lab incidents‖ nationwide, 
most notably including 1,784 in Missouri.
15
 In fact, the methamphetamine 
problem is so widespread in Missouri that the communities of Washington 
and Union were the first cities in the country to require prescriptions for 
cold and allergy medicines that contain pseudoephedrine.
16
 Mississippi 
recently followed suit by passing statewide legislation requiring a doctor‘s 
prescription for the purchase of pseudoephedrine products.
17
  
Although not as strict as the laws of Union and Washington, Missouri, 
the Combat Meth Act provided a set of guidelines restricting the sale of 
pseudoephedrine.
18
 Congress stated generally in Title 21 of the United 
States Code that ―[t]he illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and 
possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial 
and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American 
people.‖
19
 This seemingly vague and broad declaration was given sharper 
teeth to attack methamphetamine when Congress passed the Combat Meth 
 
 
PRODUCT NO. 2006-Q0317-003, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2007, at 7 n.4 (2006), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs21/21137/21137p.pdf [hereinafter THREAT 2007]. 
 15. Maps of Methamphetamine Lab Incidents, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/concern/map_lab_seizures.html (last updated Sept. 2010). The DEA 
defines a ―meth incident‖ as ―including [methamphetamine] labs, ‗dumpsites,‘ or ‗chemical and 
glassware‘ seizures.‖ Id. Missouri has led the nation in reported meth lab incidents since at least 2004. 
See id. The Missouri State Highway Patrol revealed that ―462 lab busts and discoveries of meth-
processing dump sites were reported in the state for the first three months of 2009 . . . . That was up 
from 426 in the first quarter of 2008. No other state was even close, according to the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration.‖ Missouri Again Leads Nation in Meth Incidents, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 
2009, at 12.  
 16. Christine Byers, Union is Second U.S. City to OK Anti-Meth Law, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 2009, at A1. Although sales of pseudoephedrine products have ―plummeted‖ in 
Washington, ―most local doctors were phoning in prescriptions [of pseudoephedrine products] without 
requiring office visits.‖ Christine Byers, Town Hails Its New Meth Law, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Oct. 26, 2009, at A1.  
 17. H.R. 512, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010); Elizabeth Crisp, Governor Barbour Signs Bill 
Restricting Some Cold Medicine, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Feb. 12, 2010. Oregon passed a 
similar measure in 2006. See H.R. 2485, 73d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005). 
 18. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 256 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Section 711 contains restrictions on the sales 
of pseudoephedrine products (and other products containing listed chemicals), requires the products to 
be located behind the store‘s counter, compels stores selling such products to keep a logbook of all 
purchasers, and obligates the Attorney General of the United States to establish criteria for certification 
of each business that sells listed chemicals; § 713 allows the Attorney General to establish production 
quotas on pseudoephedrine products; § 715 places restrictions on the importation of pseudoephedrine 
products and gives the Attorney General the authority to allow importation for medical and scientific 
purposes; § 723 explicitly encourages U.S. law enforcement to work with the government of Mexico 
to prevent the smuggling of Mexican pseudoephedrine into the United States; and §§ 731–34 enhance 
punishments for methamphetamine production. §§ 711, 713, 715, 723, 731–34.  
 19. 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/5
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Act.
20
 The Act requires pharmacies and convenience stores to sell no more 
than 3.6 grams of pseudoephedrine to any individual per day
21
 and 
prohibits an individual from purchasing more than nine grams during any 
thirty-day period.
22
 
As a result of the Combat Meth Act, the DEA developed mandatory 
training materials for employees of commercial enterprises that sell 
pseudoephedrine.
23
 The materials include training regarding the daily and 
monthly limits on pseudoephedrine sales per customer, logbook 
requirements, and common street names for pseudoephedrine.
24
 In 
addition to such materials, the DEA often distributes a so-called ―red 
notice,‖ which informs sellers that pseudoephedrine is ―used in the illicit 
manufacture of methamphetamine‖ and that it is ―unlawful‖ to distribute 
pseudoephedrine ―knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe,‖ that 
the pseudoephedrine ―will be used to manufacture methamphetamine.‖
25
 
Consequently, government prosecutors often introduce evidence of red 
 
 
 20. See Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 § 711. 
 21. 21 U.S.C. § 830(d)(1) (2006). 
 22. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006). Although Congress used the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic 
Act to limit sales of pseudoephedrine, the 3.6 gram daily limit and 9 gram monthly limit still allow for 
the sale of a significant number of pseudoephedrine tablets. For example, Advil Cold & Sinus Caplets 
each contain 30 milligrams of Pseudoephedrine HCl. Advil Cold and Sinus Caplets, ADVIL, 
http://www.advil.com/OurProducts/Advil-Cold-And-Sinus.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). In order to 
avoid exceeding the daily purchase limit of 3.6 grams, a store could sell as many as 146 Advil Cold & 
Sinus tablets to an individual customer per day. See OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, U.S. DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., TRAINING REQUIRED TO SELL DRUG PRODUCTS CONTAINING EPHEDRINE, 
PSEUDOEPHEDRINE, AND PHENYLPROPANOLAMINE 13, available at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj. 
gov/meth/trg_retail_081106.pdf. The same store could sell an individual customer as many as 366 
Advil Cold & Sinus tablets per month without violating the 9 gram limit. See id. at 16. Assuming a 
quantity of twenty caplets per box, a pharmacy could sell one customer as many as eighteen boxes of 
Advil Cold & Sinus per month without violating the pseudoephedrine sale limits of the Combat 
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some pharmacies are enforcing the 
act in a manner that is more restrictive than what is required by federal law, perhaps due to confusion. 
See, e.g., Candace Murphy, New Cold Medicines Causing Headaches, OAKLAND TRIB., Mar. 27, 2007 
(a pharmacy in Oakland, CA, prohibited a customer from buying more than one box of 
pseudoephedrine product per day and failed to explain the legal gram limit to him); Karl Schubert 
Wauwatosa, Letter to the Editor, Sudafed Regulations Silly, CAPITAL TIMES, May 30, 2008 (―I‘m 
treated as a criminal suspect for having a stuffy nose . . . . and am limited to one box [of 
pseudoephedrine medicine] at Wal-Mart.‖). 
 23. See 21 U.S.C. § 830(e)(1)(A)(vii) (2006) (requiring sellers of pseudoephedrine to train all of 
their employees using DEA training materials); see also OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 
22. 
 24. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 22.  
 25. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., NOTICE: 
COMBINATION EPHEDRINE AND PSEUDOEPHEDRINE DRUG PRODUCTS ARE USED IN ILLICIT 
METHAMPHETAMINE MANUFACTURE (2009) [hereinafter DEA RED NOTICE], available at http://www. 
deadiversion.usdoj.gov/chem_prog/advisories/ephedrine.pdf. 
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notices in order to argue that a particular defendant had prior knowledge 
that pseudoephedrine could be used to manufacture methamphetamine.
26
 
The Combat Meth Act appeared to be a success at first: total meth lab 
incidents in the United States dropped from 13,403 in 2005 to 6,233 in 
2007.
27
 Nevertheless, in 2008, the number of methamphetamine lab 
incidents increased to 7,485.
28
 This surge in incidents occurred in part 
because small-scale domestic methamphetamine production increased.
29
 
Such an increase in small-capacity labs was achieved ―largely by 
individuals and criminal groups that circumvent pseudoephedrine sales 
restrictions by making numerous small-quantity purchases of products that 
contain pseudoephedrine for use in laboratory operations. This method of 
acquiring pseudoephedrine is often referred to as ‗smurfing‘ . . . .‖
30
 
The DEA has also linked the escalation in domestic methamphetamine 
production to the relocation of Mexican drug operations into the United 
States.
31
 The Combat Meth Act addressed the issue of significant 
methamphetamine production and smuggling from Mexico into the United 
States, instructing the Secretary of State to ―encourage the Government of 
Mexico to take immediate action to reduce the diversion of 
pseudoephedrine.‖
32
 The Mexican government subsequently took 
aggressive action in 2007 by prohibiting pseudoephedrine imports into its 
 
 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 671, 678 (8th Cir. 2008) (―[The 
defendant] was distributing pseudoephedrine, he knew it could be used in the manufacture of meth, 
[and] the DEA agent informed him that she was concerned about the amount of pseudoephedrine he 
was selling in relation to . . . other products . . . .‖); United States v. Nguyen, 413 F.3d 1170, 1179 
(10th Cir. 2005) (―[T]he undisputed evidence showed . . . [that] Nguyen learned via the red notice that 
the pills could be used for illicit drug manufacturing . . . .‖). 
 27. Maps of Methamphetamine Lab Incidents, supra note 15. The number of national meth lab 
incidents declined steadily after 2004—reaching a low of 6,233 in 2007—but the trend reversed in 
2008 as the number climbed up to 7,485. Id.  
 28. Id. 
 29. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, PRODUCT NO. 2008-Q0317-006, 
NATIONAL METHAMPHETAMINE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2009, at 1 (2008), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/ndic/pubs32/32166/32166p.pdf [hereinafter THREAT 2009]. 
 30. Id. at 5. ―For example, in Bowling Green, Kentucky, officials report that methamphetamine 
producers are recruiting needy individuals, such as single mothers and senior citizens, to visit several 
stores and purchase pseudoephedrine below threshold levels for use in methamphetamine production.‖ 
Id. at 12–13. 
 31. Id. at 5. Low-capacity laboratories—also referred to as small-capacity—are defined as those 
―capable of producing less than 1 pound of methamphetamine per production cycle.‖ Id.   
 32. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 723(b)(3), 120 
Stat. 256, 269 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). For a general description of 
Mexican meth trafficking trends, see Methamphetamine, supra note 7. The Oregonian lamented in 
2005 that ―America's methamphetamine crisis is now rooted in Mexico,‖ noting that Mexico‘s imports 
of pseudoephedrine were ―roughly double what the country needs to meet the legitimate demands of 
cold and allergy sufferers.‖ Steve Suo, The Mexican Connection, OREGONIAN, June 5, 2005, at A1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/5
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borders as of 2008.
33
 As a result, Mexican methamphetamine production 
declined substantially, leading to a decrease in the drug‘s availability on 
the U.S. market and a subsequent increase in Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations operating from within the United States.
34
  
Due to a new method of methamphetamine production commonly 
called ―shake and bake‖ meth or ―one pot‖ meth, small, legal quantities of 
pseudoephedrine are now enough to produce methamphetamine on a small 
scale.
35
 Using pseudoephedrine purchased at stores in legal amounts by 
so-called ―smurfs,‖ methamphetamine users are able to create their 
addictive product on their own ―at nearly any location.‖
36
 The National 
Drug Intelligence Center confirmed these trends when it reported in its 
2009 Methamphetamine Threat Assessment that ―small-scale 
methamphetamine producers are . . . increasingly using the one-pot 
method of production.‖
37
 The shake and bake technique of meth 
production is spreading rapidly throughout parts of the United States, 
changing the face of methamphetamine production.
38
  
 
 
 33. THREAT 2009, supra note 29, at 2. 
 34. Id. at 1, 3. 
 35. Id. at 12–13. 
 36. Id. ―Producers often use the one-pot cook while traveling in vehicles and dispose of waste 
components along roadsides.‖ Id. at 13. 
 37. Id. at 27; see also id. at 12, 23; NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PRODUCT NO. 
2009-S0787-007, SITUATION REPORT: PSEUDOEPHEDRINE SMURFING FUELS SURGE IN LARGE-SCALE 
METHAMPHETAMINE PRODUCTION IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ndic/ 
pubs36/36407/36407p.pdf (―Pseudoephedrine smurfing has become increasingly organized and 
widespread in California, particularly since 2007, fueling an increase in the number of large-scale 
methamphetamine laboratories in the state.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 38. Justin Juozapavicius, New Meth Formula Avoids Anti-Drug Laws, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), 
Aug. 25, 2009, at 2A. ―An Associated Press review of lab seizures and interviews with state and 
federal law enforcement agents found that the new [shake and bake] method is rapidly spreading 
across the nation's midsection and is contributing to a spike in the number of meth cases after years of 
declining arrests.‖ Id. See also Larry Ballard, Meth Mixed in 2-Liter Bottles Makes Its Way into Iowa, 
DES MOINES REG., Sept. 21, 2009, at 1 (―[E]vidence of hand-held meth production has shown up in 
Muscatine and Webster counties, where narcotics officers have made roadside discoveries of empty 
plastic containers lined with the toxic byproduct of the meth process.‖); Melanie Brandert, Stickney 
Meth Lab Used New Technique, DAILY REPUBLIC (Mitchell, S.D.), Oct. 8, 2009 (noting the first 
detection of shake and bake meth by law enforcement in South Dakota); Amber Craig, Meth Labs 
Found in Home Day Care, MISS. PRESS, Nov. 5, 2009, at A1 (shake and bake meth lab found in home 
that doubled as a day care center); Editorial, ―Shake and Bake‖ Method Prevalent, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 
16, 2009, at 8A (describing the increase in shake and bake methamphetamine production in Oklahoma 
and noting that ―Tulsa already has hit an all-time high for meth busts this year at 216‖). 
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II. THE PSEUDOEPHEDRINE STATUTE 
In order to punish individuals who engage in methamphetamine 
production in the United States, Congress imposed a statutory minimum of 
ten years‘ imprisonment for the production of ―50 grams or more of 
methamphetamine . . . or 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance 
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine.‖
39
 Furthermore, in 
order to attack those who supply methamphetamine producers with 
pseudoephedrine, Congress criminalized the act of ―possess[ing] or 
distribut[ing] a listed chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause to 
believe, that the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled 
substance.‖
40
 In recent years, federal circuit courts have split on how to 
interpret ―having reasonable cause to believe‖ within the language of the 
pseudoephedrine statute.
41
 To date, they have fallen into five camps, 
 
 
 39. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2006). The pseudoephedrine statute allows for a maximum 
sentence of life in prison. Id.  
 40. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). Because of its centrality to this Note, the 
relevant text of section 841(c)(2) is provided below for reference: 
(c) Offenses involving listed chemicals 
Any person who knowingly or intentionally . . .  
 (2) possesses or distributes a listed chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause to 
believe, that the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance except as 
authorized by this subchapter . . .  
shall be fined in accordance with Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 20 years in the case of 
a violation of paragraph (1) or (2) involving a list I chemical or not more than 10 years in the 
case of a violation of this subsection other than a violation of paragraph (1) or (2) involving a 
list I chemical, or both. 
Id. (emphasis added). The 100th Congress amended the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 and 
thereby applied it to pseudoephedrine sales by criminalizing the possession or distribution of a ―listed 
chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the listed chemical will be used to 
manufacture a controlled substance.‖ Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, § 6055(a), 102 
Stat. 4181, 4318. Prior to the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the equivalent language of 
the United States Code punished a person who ―possesses any piperidine knowing, or having 
reasonable cause to believe, that the piperidine will be used to manufacture phencyclidine.‖ 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(d)(2) (1982) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (2006)). Phencyclidine—commonly 
known as ―PCP‖ or ―angel dust‖—is a controlled substance in crystalline powder form that acts as a 
―‗dissociative anesthetic,‘‖ causing reactions that include sedation, immobility, and amnesia. Drugs 
and Chemicals of Concern: Phencyclidine, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. OFFICE OF DIVERSION 
CONTROL (Apr. 2010), http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugs_concern/pcp.htm. Following a 
decline in use during the 1980s and 1990s, phencyclidine ―has re-emerged as a drug of abuse.‖ Id.   
 41. See infra notes 43–111 and accompanying text. This Note does not focus on the ―knowing‖ 
aspect of the pseudoephedrine statute, as the majority of cases regarding the statute take issue with the 
proper interpretation of ―having reasonable cause to believe.‖ The Eighth Circuit does not even include 
a specific definition of ―knowing‖ in its model jury instructions. See JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON MODEL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 463 (2009), available at http://www.jury 
instructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/crim_man_2009.pdf. Instead, it states that ―[i]ntent or knowledge may be 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/5
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divided by their views on whether a conviction based on ―reasonable cause 
to believe‖ requires a subjective or objective examination of the 
defendant‘s state of mind at the time of the alleged crime.
42
 
A. The Subjective Inquiry 
In United States v. Saffo, the Tenth Circuit held that the ―reasonable 
cause to believe‖ standard of the pseudoephedrine statute ―involves a 
subjective inquiry that looks to whether the particular defendant accused 
of the crime knew or had reasonable cause to believe the listed chemical 
would be used to manufacture a controlled substance.‖
43
 In other words, 
an evaluation must occur ―through the lens of this particular defendant, 
rather than from the prospective [sic] of a hypothetical reasonable man.‖
44
 
Through its interpretation, the Tenth Circuit created a subjective standard 
that views reasonable cause to believe as something ―akin to actual 
knowledge.‖
45 
The Saffo court reached such a conclusion in part by looking to the 
New Jersey case of State v. Smith,
46
 which involved statutory 
interpretation of language that contains some similarities to the 
pseudoephedrine statute.
47
 In the course of its decision, the Smith court 
 
 
proved like anything else. You may consider any statements made and acts done by the defendant, and 
all the facts and circumstances in evidence which may aid in a determination of the defendant's 
knowledge or intent.‖ Id. at 468 (citation omitted). Other courts have ―‗recognized deliberate 
ignorance of criminal activity as the equivalent of knowledge.‘‖ United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 
1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1143 (11th Cir. 1993)). 
 42. See infra notes 43–111 and accompanying text.  
 43. 227 F.3d 1260, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000). The Saffo case entailed a complicated conspiracy to 
sell pseudoephedrine for the production of methamphetamine. Id. at 1263–67. The operation occurred 
on a massive scale: Saffo and her co-conspirators sold over 197 million tablets of pseudoephedrine in 
one year alone. Id. at 1266. By comparison, the Saffo court notes that the pharmaceutical company 
Warner-Lambert sold 38 million caplets of Sudafed nationwide during the same time period. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1268–69. The Tenth Circuit is the only federal circuit to date that has employed a fully 
subjective standard to evaluate the ―reasonable cause to believe‖ language within the pseudoephedrine 
statute. See infra notes 64–104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the analysis performed by 
other circuits in regard to the pseudoephedrine statute. 
 45. Id. at 1269. Although the Tenth Circuit established a new and subjective standard for how to 
interpret the ―reasonable cause to believe language‖ of the pseudoephedrine statute, the court 
ultimately held that Saffo had ―actual knowledge‖ that the pseudoephedrine she sold was purchased 
for the purpose of methamphetamine production. Id. The court reached its decision because the trial 
jury found Saffo guilty of money laundering under a statute that criminalizes the act of conducting a 
financial transaction ―knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the 
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.‖ Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (date of code not 
provided)) (emphasis added by the Saffo court) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 46. 123 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1956). 
 47. See Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Smith, 123 A.2d at 372). The defendants in Smith were 
charged in part with violating a voting fraud statute that punished a person for voting in a primary 
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commented, ―[g]uilt is personal; the determinant here is the reasoned 
conviction of the mind of the accused, a subjective inquiry, not a 
theoretical, vicarious belief of the hypothetical reasonable man, as the 
State and the accused would have it.‖
48
 The Saffo decision‘s conclusion 
echoes Smith, holding that the pseudoephedrine statute requires a 
subjective standard of scienter that should not be based on the perspective 
of ―a hypothetical reasonable man.‖
49
  
Five years later, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed and strengthened its 
subjective inquiry analysis in United States v. Truong.
50
 In Truong, the 
defendant lacked full proficiency in English
51
 and claimed he did not even 
know the word ―methamphetamine‖ until he was arrested.
52
 Nevertheless, 
he was charged under the pseudoephedrine statute after selling thousands 
of pseudoephedrine pills to certain buyers on a regular basis during his 
employment at a Texaco gas station convenience store.
53
 Noting that 
Truong ―told the police he did not know the purpose to which the 
pseudoephedrine he sold would be put,‖ the Tenth Circuit reversed the 
appellant‘s conviction as a result of a lack of evidence that he knew or had 
reasonable cause to believe that the products he sold would be 
manufactured into methamphetamine.
54
  
At trial, the government established that Truong clandestinely sold 
pseudoephedrine for cash after his store closed and that he hid the 
pseudoephedrine tablets in styrofoam cups.
55
 Despite such potentially 
incriminating evidence, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the ―unusually 
specific mens rea requirement of [the pseudoephedrine statute] requires 
more.‖
56
 The court reached this conclusion in part by reaffirming Saffo‘s 
holding that a reasonable cause to believe is something ―akin to actual 
 
 
while ―knowing or having reason to believe himself not entitled to so vote.‖ Smith, 123 A.2d at 369 
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-22 (year not provided)). 
 48. Smith, 123 A.2d at 371 (emphasis added). 
 49. Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1268–69. Scienter is a ―degree of knowledge that makes a person legally 
responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (3d 
pocket ed. 2006). 
 50. 425 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 51. Id. at 1287, 1290. 
 52. Brief of Appellant at 9, United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-
5094). 
 53. Truong, 425 F.3d at 1284–88. 
 54. Id. at 1290–91. 
 55. Id. at 1290. 
 56. Id. at 1291. 
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knowledge.‖
57
 The Tenth Circuit also referenced its Buonocore decision, 
in which it held that because ―the reasonable cause to believe inquiry ‗is 
entirely subjective, the inquiry is not to be viewed from the perspective of 
a hypothetical reasonable person.‘‖
58
 As a result, the court determined that 
in order to convict Truong, the prosecution would need to present 
evidence that would allow the jury to decide that Truong ―had actual 
knowledge, or something close to it.‖
59
 
In addition to its own precedent, the Truong court also looked to 
congressional intent to determine which standard of scienter the Tenth 
Circuit should use to evaluate the pseudoephedrine statute: 
Presumably because of the large-scale legitimate use of 
pseudoephedrine as a cold remedy, and a concern about not 
imposing unreasonable duties or risk of criminal liability on the 
pharmacies and convenience stores that sell this common product, 
Congress limited the reach of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 . . . to sellers with 
the actual knowledge or intent (or, in this Circuit, something ―akin 
to actual knowledge‖) that it would be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine.
60 
The court concluded that Truong could have believed that his customers 
were addicted to pseudoephedrine itself, or that he and the purchasers were 
simply avoiding taxes by conducting the transactions in cash and without 
record keeping.
61
 Although such intentions did not ―redound to Mr. 
Truong‘s credit,‖ the court held that he could not be punished under the 
pseudoephedrine statute based on these facts alone.
62
 Using a subjective 
 
 
 57. Id. at 1289 (quoting United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1269 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 58. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124, 1133 (10th Cir. 
2005)). The Tenth Circuit released the Buonocore opinion three months before Truong was decided.  
 59. Id. The Truong court did not explicitly define what it meant by ―actual knowledge, or 
something close to it,‖ but noted that ―[o]rdinarily, the government satisfies this burden by introducing 
evidence that the defendant had received an official notification or warning regarding the substance.‖ 
Id. For example, as proof of notice, the government might establish that the defendant had received a 
red notice. Id. at 1289–90 (quoting United States v. Nguyen, 413 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2005)); 
see also DEA RED NOTICE, supra note 25. For an additional example of proof used by the government 
to prove its burden, see Truong, 425 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Buonocore, 416 F.3d at 1126) (―DEA 
recorded controlled buy in which purchaser said ‗the meth cooks must be cookin like crazy‘ and ‗I 
must have had a run, there's a bunch of meth cooks in town, that's what their [sic] using them for.‘‖). 
 60. Truong, 425 F.3d at 1291. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. In its decision, the Truong court stressed that the government offered no proof that the 
defendant had been warned of the dangers of methamphetamine production from pseudoephedrine and 
that the testimony it did offer indicated that Truong might not have understood such an instruction in 
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standard of scienter and noting the common legal use of pseudoephedrine 
as a cold remedy, the court overturned Truong‘s conviction.
63 
B. The Objective Understanding Approach 
Other circuits have denounced the Tenth Circuit‘s subjective inquiry 
and adopted a more objective approach that applies the defendant‘s 
knowledge to a reasonable person test.
64
 For example, in United States v. 
Galvan, five years after Saffo, the Eighth Circuit criticized the Saffo 
opinion when a defendant requested a jury instruction that would equate 
―reasonable cause to believe‖ with a standard that was ―akin to actual 
knowledge.‖
65
 The defendant Galvan was charged with one count of 
violating the pseudoephedrine statute after law enforcement observed him 
purchasing pseudoephedrine products and discovered pseudoephedrine 
pills in his car.
66
 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed Galvan‘s 
conviction and sentence.
67
 The court briefly noted that the proposed Saffo-
style jury instruction would ―render the ‗reasonable cause to believe‘ 
phrase redundant.‖
68
 Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
defendant‘s conviction by concluding that the district judge ―did not err‖ 
when she delivered jury instructions ―using only the language of the 
[pseudoephedrine] statute.‖
69
  
 
 
English even if it were provided to him. Id. at 1290. In addition, the court observed that during 
Truong‘s trial, a police officer testified to the fact that ―not everyone knows of the relationship 
between [pseudoephedrine and methamphetamine].‖ Id.  
 63. Id. at 1291. Two recent law review comments discuss the circuit split regarding the 
pseudoephedrine statute: one argues in favor of the Tenth Circuit‘s subjective standard, while the other 
concludes an objective standard should be adopted. Compare Brian Walsh, Comment, Circuits Split as 
to Statutory Interpretation of the Mens Rea Requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2): The Tenth Circuit 
Provides the Correct Answer, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 123 (2010), with Jonathan L. Hood, Comment, What is 
Reasonable Cause to Believe?: The Mens Rea Required for Conviction Under 21 U.S.C. § 841, 30 
PACE L. REV. 1360 (2010). This Note reaches a different conclusion. See infra notes 126–62 and 
accompanying text. 
 64. See infra notes 65–75 and accompanying text. 
 65. United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Saffo, 227 
F.3d 1260, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2000)).  
 66. Id. at 955. Following arrest, Galvan offered to reveal the location of methamphetamine labs 
in exchange for no prison time. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 957. The Tenth Circuit in Truong made only momentary reference to the Eighth 
Circuit‘s disapproval of Saffo in a footnote that observed, ―The Eighth Circuit has criticized our 
interpretation.‖ United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1289 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Galvan, 407 
F.3d at 957). Despite acknowledging the criticism, the Truong court did not respond to it explicitly. Id.  
 69. Galvan, 407 F.3d at 957. The Galvan court based its opinion in part on the reasoning of the 
Ninth Circuit Kaur opinion, id., which held that ―reasonable cause to believe would be superfluous if it 
meant knowledge.‖ United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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In addition to criticizing the Saffo decision, the Eighth Circuit has 
constructed its own standard for purposes of interpreting the 
pseudoephedrine statute, employing a more objective inquiry than the 
Saffo court.
70
 In United States v. Bewig, the court concluded that the 
pseudoephedrine statute ―does not punish the inadvertent sale of a listed 
chemical to an illegal drug manufacturer, but instead punishes only those 
sales where the seller understands, or should reasonably understand, that 
the chemical will be used illegally.‖
71
 This language by itself does not 
create a cogent standard,
72
 but the court attempted to clarify its position by 
stating that ―[t]he statute does not require a defendant to read a purchaser‘s 
mind.‖
73
 Nevertheless, the court obfuscated the issue by holding that ―[a] 
reasonable person would understand what conduct is prohibited by this 
standard.‖
74
 The Eighth Circuit ultimately affirmed Bewig‘s conviction in 
part because the defendant ―told investigators he knew pseudoephedrine 
was used in the production of methamphetamines.‖
75
  
 
 
 70. Compare United States v. Bewig, 354 F.3d 731, 737–38 (8th Cir. 2003), with Saffo, 227 F.3d 
at 1268. 
 71. Bewig, 354 F.3d at 737 (emphasis added). In Bewig, the defendant was convicted of 
conspiracy to distribute pseudoephedrine, ―having reasonable cause to believe‖ that it would be used to 
make the controlled substance methamphetamine. Id. at 734–35. The defendant ordered unusually 
large quantities of pseudoephedrine for the gas station convenience store that he owned and managed, 
causing his supplier to contact the DEA. Id. at 734. Citing Bewig‘s knowledge of pseudoephedrine‘s 
role in methamphetamine production, as well as other factors, the Eighth Circuit ultimately affirmed 
his twenty-year prison sentence. Id. at 734–35. 
 72. For example, a question arises as to what the Bewig standard would dictate in the following 
hypothetical situation: convenience store worker Jack Pseudo—just hired and new to town—sells a 
package of pseudoephedrine to John Meth, who is widely known in the community as a meth 
producer. The Bewig court would not punish Jack Pseudo for an ―inadvertent sale‖ of pseudoephedrine 
to Meth, but would do so if he should have reasonably understood the illegal use of the chemical 
contemplated by Meth. See Bewig, 354 F.3d at 734–35. If the court does not expect Jack Pseudo to 
read the mind of John Meth and ascertain his unlawful intentions, see id. at 737, then one might 
conclude that Pseudo should be found not guilty under the Bewig test. Unfortunately, the Bewig court 
never defines an ―inadvertent sale.‖ See id. This lack of definition is problematic because it leaves 
open the question of whether an inadvertent sale occurs when the seller himself is unaware of the 
purchaser‘s intentions, or when the seller is reasonably unaware of the purchaser‘s intentions. 
 73. Id. at 737.  
 74. Id. at 738. The court claims that a ―reasonable person would understand‖ the statute, id. , but 
the circuit courts themselves cannot agree on how the statute should operate, let alone the hypothetical 
reasonable person. See generally supra notes 43–73 and accompanying text; infra notes 75–111 and 
accompanying text. 
 75. Bewig, 354 F.3d at 734–35; see supra note 71. 
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C. The Objective “Reasonable Person” Approach 
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit‘s ―reasonable understanding‖ approach 
to the pseudoephedrine statute, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a 
reasonable person standard. In United States v. Prather, the court 
determined that it must look to the plain meaning of the pseudoephedrine 
statute in order to interpret its language correctly.
76
 The Prather court 
agreed with a prior Seventh Circuit decision that involved PCP/piperidine 
instead of methamphetamine/pseudoephedrine.
77
 United States v. Green 
stated that ―Congress intended to impose a broad prohibition against the 
manufacture of PCP, criminalizing both the actual manufacture of PCP as 
well as the possession of piperidine (an essential ingredient of PCP) when 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe the piperidine would be 
used to manufacture PCP.‖78  
With congressional intent in mind, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the 
judge‘s wordy jury instruction that declared, ―[T]he question is what 
would a reasonable person reasonably have believed based on the evidence 
known to the defendant.‖
79
 When the jury requested a clarification of the 
instruction, the district court judge explained that the pseudoephedrine 
statute was asking, ―[B]ased on what [the defendant] did know, would a 
reasonable person, an abstract reasonable person have cause to believe that 
the pseudoephedrine . . . would be diverted [to manufacture 
methamphetamine].‖
80
 In essence, the trial court asked the jury to inject 
the knowledge of the defendant into the mind of a hypothetical reasonable 
 
 
 76. 205 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 77. Id. (citing United States v. Green, 779 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
 78. Green, 779 F.2d at 1319 (emphasis added). The Green case involved a conviction stemming 
from the sale of piperidine, where the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe that it would 
be manufactured into phencyclidine. Id. at 1314.  
 79. Prather, 205 F.3d at 1271 (alteration in original) (quoting the jury instructions used at trial).  
 80. Id. (quoting the jury instructions used at trial). According to Prather‘s brief, the trial court 
judge admitted that he was ―perplex[ed]‖ by the pseudoephedrine statute, as was the jury—it requested 
clarification of the jury instructions after more than a day of deliberation. Brief for Appellant at 14–15, 
Prather, 205 F.3d 1265 (No. 98-9094). Despite the confusion of the judge, the jury convicted the 
defendant in part under 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2), Prather, 205 F.3d at 1267, which is the prior location of 
the statutory language that currently resides under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2) 
(1994) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (2006)). It is important to note that the Prather court 
reviewed the jury instructions under a plain error standard, which requires a reversal if the challenged 
jury instruction is ―a plainly incorrect statement of the law and: ‗that it was probably responsible for an 
incorrect verdict, leading to substantial injustice.‘‖ Prather, 205 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Montgomery v. 
Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, it is possible that the court might have 
reached a different conclusion if the defense counsel had objected to the jury instructions during the 
actual trial, thereby triggering a stricter standard of review. 
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person.
81
 The jury was then instructed to determine whether such a person 
would have had cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine sold by the 
defendant was purchased for the purpose of producing 
methamphetamine.
82
  
Although its initial inquiry focused on the meaning of ―reasonable 
cause to believe,‖ the Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that ―overwhelming 
evidence‖ indicated that Prather had ―actual knowledge‖ of 
methamphetamine production resulting from his sales of 
pseudoephedrine.
83
 By concentrating on the defendant‘s actual knowledge 
of methamphetamine production, the Prather court was able to avoid a 
more thorough analysis of the ―reasonable cause to believe‖ language 
contained within the pseudoephedrine statute.
84
 Instead, the court found 
that the judge‘s complicated definition of reasonable cause to believe did 
not result in plain error, and based its decision in large part on the fact that 
the jury convicted Prather under a theory of actual knowledge on nine out 
of ten counts.
85
 
D. The Objective-Subjective Hybrid Approach 
The Ninth Circuit has taken a more concrete position than the Eleventh, 
by means of a hybrid analysis of the scienter requirements within the 
pseudoephedrine statute.
86
 In United States v. Kaur, the trial court 
instructed the jury that the pseudoephedrine statute included a hybrid 
standard of scienter consisting of ―both subjective and objective 
elements. . . . [T]he government had to prove that [the defendant] either 
 
 
 81. Prather, 205 F.3d at 1271. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. (emphasis added). The defendant Prather sold over 830 million pseudoephedrine tablets to 
173 customers via a mail-order wholesale business, despite the fact that most of his customers lacked 
proper business licenses. Id. at 1268. In addition, Prather continued selling pseudoephedrine tablets to 
customers whom he knew had been investigated by law enforcement; he also received an attorney‘s 
opinion letter indicating that his business activities ―might be considered prima facie evidence of an 
intent to violate the law.‖ Id. After his company‘s offices were raided by the DEA, Prather‘s company 
persisted in its pseudoephedrine business while simultaneously increasing its prices. Id.  
 84. I do not mean to imply that the Eleventh Circuit intentionally avoided further analysis of the 
―reasonable cause to believe‖ language in order to skirt the issue, even though that was the effect of its 
decision. Rather, I mean to suggest that the Prather court likely would have engaged in a more 
thorough analysis of such language if the court had decided the case based upon whether the defendant 
had a ―reasonable cause to believe,‖ instead of actual knowledge. 
 85. Prather, 205 F.3d at 1271; see Brief for Appellant at 4, Prather, 205 F.3d 1265 (No. 98-
9094). 
 86. See United States v. Johal, 428 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 
1155 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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knew, or knew facts that would have made a reasonable person aware, 
that the pseudoephedrine would be used to make methamphetamine.‖
87
 
Attempting to determine congressional intent, the court concluded that 
―the statute clearly presents knowledge and reasonable cause to believe as 
two distinct alternatives.‖
88
 At first glance, the Ninth Circuit appeared to 
reject Saffo when it held that ―reasonable cause to believe would be 
superfluous if it meant knowledge.‖
89
 Nevertheless, the Kaur decision 
ultimately observed that the Saffo holding—i.e., that reasonable cause to 
believe is something akin to knowledge—was not incompatible with the 
proffered jury instruction given at trial.
90
  
In the shadow of these conflicting statements, the Ninth Circuit 
clarified its position one year later in United States v. Johal.
91
 Johal owned 
a grocery store in Spokane, Washington, where he sold large quantities of 
pseudoephedrine tablets to undercover DEA agents; one of the agents told 
Johal that ―he was a cook and wanted to make ‗crystal.‘‖
92
 Convicted 
under the pseudoephedrine statute, Johal argued on appeal ―that the statute 
. . . put[s] unwitting store clerks at risk of going to prison simply for 
selling legal cold medications.‖
93
 In affirming Johal‘s conviction, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the pseudoephedrine statute ―requires that a 
defendant subjectively know facts that either cause him or would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that the ingredients are being used to produce 
illegal drugs.‖
94
 The court reasoned that such a standard helps prevent a 
defendant from being ―prosecuted for mere inadvertent conduct.‖
95
  
 
 
 87. Kaur, 382 F.3d at 1157–58 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. at 1157.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 1158 n.5. It is hard to reconcile these different conclusions within the same opinion. 
The Kaur court preferred a hybrid standard of scienter that incorporates subjective and objective 
elements (i.e., what would a reasonable person in the defendant‘s situation with his knowledge 
believe), but also believed that if the standard becomes too subjective, then it transforms ―reasonable 
cause to believe‖ into an unnecessary phrase. See id. at 1157–58. 
 91. 428 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 92. Id. at 826. ―Crystal‖ is a street name for methamphetamine. Methamphetamine, supra note 7, 
at 1. 
 93. Johal, 428 F.3d at 827. 
 94. Id. This is a subjective-objective hybrid standard, essentially taking the defendant‘s 
subjective knowledge and inserting it into the mind of a reasonable person to see whether it would 
cause him to believe that the pseudoephedrine he sold would be used in the production of 
methamphetamine. See id.   
 95. Id. To prevent an incorrect conviction, some courts also look to the defendant‘s proficiency 
in English. The Tenth Circuit observed that Truong had some difficulties understanding English. 
United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2005). In the case of United States v. Chon, 
the defendant was acquitted by a jury of two counts of distribution of pseudoephedrine for 
methamphetamine production after claiming that, as a Korean native, he lacked an understanding of 
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E. Circumvention 
The Seventh Circuit has avoided delving into the fray by noting the 
circuit split without joining it.
96
 In United States v. Khattab, the defendant 
was charged under the pseudoephedrine statute and convicted in a bench 
trial after attempting to purchase one hundred boxes of pseudoephedrine 
tablets from a DEA informant.
97
 On appeal, the court observed that the 
district judge used the ―more stringent standard of the Tenth Circuit‖ in his 
decision, finding that ―Khattab knew that the pseudoephedrine he 
attempted to purchase would be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine.‖
98
 As a result of the defendant‘s actual knowledge of 
methamphetamine production, the court concluded that ―this case is not 
the proper vehicle for us to weigh in on the circuit split regarding the 
proper mens rea standard for 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).‖
99
  
Although the Khattab court failed to take a position within the circuit 
split regarding the pseudoephedrine statute, it did address a clever 
argument of the defendant relating to his mens rea.
100
 Many incriminating 
statements of Khattab introduced by the prosecution appeared to indicate 
that he understood that methamphetamine is produced from 
pseudoephedrine.
101
 Khattab argued that this evidence alone did not 
―sufficiently prove‖ that he knew ―that he or the people he planned to 
 
 
English sufficient to understand that the pseudoephedrine he sold would be used to produce 
methamphetamine. United States v. Chon, 291 F. App‘x 877, 879 (10th Cir. 2008). Despite his 
defense, Chon ultimately was convicted of one charge of possession of pseudoephedrine in violation of 
the pseudoephedrine statute. Id. at 878. 
 96. See United States v. Khattab, 536 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 97. Id. at 766. A DEA agent testified at trial that the one hundred boxes sought after by Khattab 
amounted to 57,600 pseudoephedrine tablets, which would be enough to treat two thousand people 
with respiratory problems for a week. Id. at 767. 
 98. Id. at 769 (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. Compare Khattab, 536 F.3d at 769, with United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1271 
(11th Cir. 2000) (both courts looked to evidence of actual knowledge to decide their respective cases, 
but the Khattab court was more of a spectator, noticing the subjective Saffo-like standard of the district 
judge and concluding that it would not stake out a position on the circuit split, whereas the Prather 
court observed the hybrid standard employed by the district judge and found it to be without plain 
error). A difference in time of decision also explains the reason why the Khattab court explicitly 
announced it would avoid the circuit split while the Prather court made no such pronouncement—
Prather was decided in early 2000 before the Tenth Circuit released Saffo, while Khattab was issued in 
August 2008. See Khattab, 536 F.3d 765; United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2000); 
Prather, 205 F.3d 1265. 
 100. See Khattab, 536 F.3d at 770. 
 101. Id. For example, the government recorded telephone conversations and an in-person meeting 
with a potential seller of pseudoephedrine; Khattab told the seller that individuals extract substances 
from the pseudoephedrine to make a narcotic and that ―they sniff it.‖ Id. at 767 (quoting transcript of 
the meeting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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distribute [the pseudoephedrine] to would use it to make 
methamphetamine.‖
102
 Khattab contended that if the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed his conviction, it would mean that ―any individual who purchased 
Sudafed and knew it could be used to manufacture methamphetamine 
would be guilty under the statute.‖
103
 In its quick dismissal of Khattab‘s 
argument, the court concluded that the DEA agent‘s testimony at trial 
―reveal[ed] the criminality underlying the transaction,‖ which, in turn, 
proved that Khattab had knowledge that the pseudoephedrine he sold 
would be processed into methamphetamine.
104
 Consequently, the Khattab 
court did not address the meaning of ―reasonable cause to believe.‖
105
 
F. A State of Split 
The federal circuits thus fall into one of five camps with respect to the 
scienter requirements of the pseudoephedrine statute. The Eighth Circuit 
looks objectively to what the distributor of pseudoephedrine should 
reasonably understand;
106
 the Eleventh Circuit approves of using an 
objective reasonable person test;
107
 the Tenth Circuit searches for a 
subjective standard similar to knowledge;
108
 the Ninth Circuit uses a 
hybrid standard of subjective and objective elements;
109
 and the Seventh 
Circuit circumvents the issue.
110
 Many of the major cases analyzed in this 
section have been appealed to the Supreme Court, but none has been 
granted certiorari.
111
 Despite the Court‘s silence on the issue, an analysis 
 
 
 102. Id. at 770. 
 103. Id. at 770 (emphasis added) (quoting Brief of Appellant at 15, United States v. Khattab, 536 
F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-2522)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Id. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The evidence at trial indicated that Khattab 
knew that his customers extracted something from the pseudoephedrine, that ―they sniff[ed] it,‖ and 
that they preferred unpackaged pills over blister packs (indicative of methamphetamine production), 
but no evidence referred to by the Seventh Circuit indicated that Khattab actually knew that the 
pseudoephedrine was to be used for methamphetamine production. See id. Nevertheless, the court 
determined that Khattab possessed the requisite knowledge for conviction under the pseudoephedrine 
statute. Id. In Truong, the Tenth Circuit used similar facts to reach a different conclusion: ―For all we 
know from the evidence presented . . . [the defendant] may have thought that . . . pseudoephedrine [is 
itself] subject to abuse or that his purchasers were addicted to over-the-counter medications.‖ United 
States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1291 (10th Cir. 2005).  
 105. See Khattab, 536 F.3d at 769–70.  
 106. See supra Part II.B. 
 107. See supra Part II.C. 
 108. See supra Part II.A. 
 109. See supra Part II.D. 
 110. See supra Part II.E. 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Johal, 428 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1128 
(2006); United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 967 (2005); 
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of other federal statutes with similar language provides helpful insight into 
the language of the pseudoephedrine statute, as well as congressional 
intent.
112 
III. ―HAVING REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE‖—OTHER FEDERAL 
STATUTES 
Six other criminal statutes in Titles 18 and 21 of the United States 
Code contain the phrase ―having reasonable cause to believe‖ and provide 
an opportunity to compare how courts have interpreted the scienter 
standard in such instances.
113
 For example, in the Eighth Circuit case 
United States v. Iron Eyes, the defendant was convicted under the 
firearms chapter of the U.S. Code for ―knowing or having reasonable 
cause to believe that the firearm . . . was stolen.‖
114
 At trial, Iron Eyes 
contended that although he was carrying stolen firearms within two 
suitcases at the time of his arrest, he was drunk and did not know that the 
suitcases contained stolen firearms.
115
 The court first looked to the more 
objective, reasonable man approach of Prather and rejected it, holding 
instead that the subjective Saffo approach was supported by ―[t]he 
language of the statute itself.‖
116
 The Iron Eyes court found that ―the 
better reading . . . requires proof that a defendant possessed a gun that it 
would have been reasonable for him or her, in particular, to believe was 
stolen.‖
117
  
 
 
United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 974 (2001); United 
States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 879 (2000). 
 112. See infra Part III. 
 113. See 18 U.S.C. § 842(h) (2006) (forbidding transport/possession of stolen explosive 
materials); 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6)–(7) (2006) (concerning equipment used for the purposes of 
manufacturing controlled substances); 18 U.S.C. § 844(o) (2006) (prohibiting the transfer of explosive 
materials for criminal purposes); 21 U.S.C. § 864(a) (2006) (laws regarding anhydrous ammonia); 18 
U.S.C. § 922 (2005) (relating to unlawful acts involving firearms); 21 U.S.C. § 960(d) (2006) 
(penalties for import/export of controlled substances). In addition to the pseudoephedrine statute, the 
Controlled Substances Act contains the language ―having reasonable cause to believe‖ elsewhere 
within Title 21. See 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6)–(7); 21 U.S.C. § 864(a); 21 U.S.C. § 960 (d)(3). For 
example, § 843 prohibits the distribution of ―any three-neck round-bottom flask‖ if a person has 
reasonable cause to believe that the flask will be used in the production of controlled substances. 21 
U.S.C. § 843(a)(7). 
 114. United States v. Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 922(j) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115. Id. The Eighth Circuit noted within its decision that the ―suitcases‖ were in fact rifle cases. 
Id.   
 116. Id. at 784. 
 117. Id. (citing United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2000)). In a similar 
case, the Third Circuit noted that ―[w]e have not addressed the meaning of ‗reasonable cause to 
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At trial, the district judge read the words of § 922(j) as jury 
instructions, informing the jury that ―in order to convict it must find that 
‗Iron Eyes knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was 
stolen.‘‖
118
 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found this language to be 
acceptable, noting that judges in its circuit do not need to define 
―knowing‖ because the term is widely known.
119
 However, the court did 
not address whether ―reasonable cause to believe‖ is also a subject of 
common knowledge.
120
 Instead, the court affirmed the defendant‘s 
conviction, finding that no error had occurred that would trigger a reversal 
of the jury‘s verdict.
121 
Despite its decision not to define ―reasonable cause to believe‖ within 
Titles 18 and 21 of the U.S. Code, Congress was not silent in all statutes 
using the phrase. For instance, Title 15 prohibits a person from reporting 
false consumer information to a consumer reporting agency ―if the person 
knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is 
inaccurate.‖
122
 The previous version of the statute prior to amendment in 
2003 stated: ―[I]f the person knows or consciously avoids knowing that the 
information is inaccurate.‖
123
 The change appears to indicate a desire on 
the part of Congress to broaden the scope of the statute.
124
 The current 
statute defines ―reasonable cause to believe‖ as ―having specific 
knowledge, other than solely allegations by the consumer, that would 
cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the accuracy of 
the information.‖
125
 This definition echoes the Prather standard quoted 
 
 
believe‘ in the context of § 922(j) or a similar statute. Only the Eighth Circuit has discussed the 
language meaningfully.‖ United States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344, 349 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Iron 
Eyes, 367 F.3d at 785). 
 118. Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d at 785 (quoting the district judge‘s instructions to the jury). 
 119. Id. See supra note 41.  
 120. See Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d at 785. In light of the court‘s discussion and observance of a circuit 
split regarding the meaning of ―reasonable cause to believe,‖ it is unlikely that it would find such a 
term to be ―common knowledge.‖ See id. at 784. 
 121. Id. at 784, 787. Although the defendant‘s drunkenness might have caused him to be mistaken 
as to the contents of the ―suitcases‖ in question, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the jury instructions 
were ―adequate‖ and therefore upheld the verdict. Id. at 783, 785. The court noted that ―we are 
confident that the jury understood what the law was. The jury simply rejected Mr. Iron Eyes‘s defense 
on the facts.‖ Id. at 785. The Iron Eyes court did not present much explanation for its decision to use a 
subjective standard akin to that of the Tenth Circuit. See id. at 784–85.  
 122. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 123. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added), amended by Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-159, § 312(b)(1), 117 Stat. 1952, 1990. 
 124. By changing the statutory language from ―knows or consciously avoids‖ to ―knows or has 
reasonable cause to believe,‖ Congress relaxed the scienter standard required to prove liability under 
the statute. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
 125. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(D) (2006).  
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earlier: ―[T]he question is what would a reasonable person reasonably 
have believed based on the evidence known to the defendant.‖
126
 
IV. ATTACKING METHAMPHETAMINE PRODUCTION WITH STATUTORY 
LANGUAGE BETTER SUITED FOR THE CURRENT THREAT 
A. New Challenge, Old Problem 
The government of the United States faces a new challenge to an old 
problem: reported methamphetamine incidents are on the rise after years 
of decline.
127
 Methamphetamine production is becoming harder to target, 
in part because the new shake and bake method requires ―an amount [of 
pseudoephedrine] easily obtained under even the toughest anti-meth laws 
that have been adopted across the nation . . . .‖
128
 If Congress is to reduce 
methamphetamine production, it must find a new way to attack the supply 
or demand of pseudoephedrine and methamphetamine.
129
  
The new shake and bake method of methamphetamine production 
further complicates the issue of how to interpret the pseudoephedrine 
statute. In light of the fact that small and otherwise legal purchases of 
pseudoephedrine can be used to create methamphetamine, it may become 
harder for juries and courts to determine what should constitute knowledge 
or a reasonable cause to believe that a purchase of pseudoephedrine is for 
the purpose of producing methamphetamine. For example, suppose a 
customer attempts to purchase one six-pack of beer and one box of 
Sudafed (2.36 grams of pseudoephedrine) at his local pharmacy.
130
 The 
pharmacist has never seen the customer prior to the encounter, but notices 
that he has trouble paying attention and that some of his teeth are missing 
 
 
 126. United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting the trial judge). See 
supra text accompanying notes 80–82. 
 127. Juozapavicius, supra note 38. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Other than a proposed amendment to the pseudoephedrine statute, this Note does not address 
other ways in which Congress could attack the domestic supply of and demand for pseudoephedrine 
and methamphetamine.  
 130. For reference, Sudafed is sold in packages of 24, 48, and 96 tablets. Sudafed Congestion, 
SUDAFED, http://www.sudafed.com/products/adult/sinus-congestion/sudafed-congestion (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2011). Each Sudafed tablet contains 30 milligrams of pseudoephedrine HCl. Sudafed 
Congestion, SUDAFED, http://www.sudafed.com/products/adult/sinus-congestion/sudafed-congestion 
(follow ―Ingredients‖ hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). According to the DEA, a box of 146 30 
milligram pseudoephedrine tablets contains 3.6 grams of actual pseudoephedrine. OFFICE OF 
DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 22. Therefore, one box of 96 Sudafed tablets should contain 
approximately 2.36 grams of pseudoephedrine. 
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or rotting.
131
 In addition, the customer has a few red marks on his face and 
looks to be about thirty-five years old, even though the birth date on his 
driver‘s license indicates he is twenty-two years old.
132
 Is the customer in 
question a meth addict smurf, purchasing the pseudoephedrine for 
purposes of small-capacity methamphetamine production, or is he simply 
someone with a bad cold and acne who cannot afford to see a dentist and 
dermatologist? And from a policy perspective, should a pharmacist or 
convenience store worker feel the need to profile her customers to avoid 
criminal charges? 
If the pseudoephedrine statute remains unchanged, then the 
hypothetical pharmacist in the above scenario could, in theory, be subject 
to federal prosecution under the pseudoephedrine statute.
133
 With the 
advent of the shake and bake method, it may become harder for the courts 
to answer the question of what constitutes ―reasonable cause to believe.‖ 
Since the sale of two boxes of cold medicine could lead directly to small-
scale methamphetamine production in a soda bottle as the purchaser drives 
home, Congress must reevaluate the language of the pseudoephedrine 
statute and update it to reflect the changing technology of 
methamphetamine production.
134 
B. New Statutory Language 
In order to attack the new threat of shake and bake methamphetamine 
production, while simultaneously protecting the ability of pharmacy and 
convenience store workers to go about their business without fear of 
selling pseudoephedrine products, this Note proposes an amendment to the 
pseudoephedrine statute to read as follows: 
 
 
 131. Prolonged methamphetamine usage can cause serious tooth damage and memory loss. NAT‘L 
INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 9, at 1. 
 132. For examples of the startling disfigurement of facial features caused by prolonged 
methamphetamine use, see The Faces of Meth, OREGONIAN, May 2005, http://www.facesofmeth.us/ 
images/facesOFmeth.poster.pdf. See also Meth Mouth, METHFREETN.ORG, http://www.methfreetn. 
org/mediakit/files/MethMouthPoster.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (poster issued by the Tennessee 
District Attorney‘s Office depicting the effects of methamphetamine on human teeth).  
 133. Whether or not a prosecutor at present would actually decide to charge a pharmacist in such a 
case is irrelevant; if shake and bake methamphetamine production continues to rise in popularity 
among meth users, then a United States Attorney could in theory use her prosecutorial discretion to 
charge a pharmacist or convenience store worker under the pseudoephedrine statute in the scenario 
described in the text accompanying notes 130–31, supra.  
 134. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
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(c) Offenses involving listed chemicals 
Any individual within a business organization that is authorized to 
sell pseudoephedrine under the Combat Methamphetamine Act of 
2005 who knowingly or intentionally . . .  
 (2) possesses or distributes pseudoephedrine in excess of the 
limits prescribed by the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act 
of 2005 shall be fined in accordance with Title 18 or imprisoned not 
more than 5 years. 
 Notwithstanding Section (c)(2), any person who knowingly or 
intentionally distributes pseudoephedrine in compliance with the 
Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 shall suffer no 
civil or criminal liability from such sale, unless the distributor had 
actual knowledge that the pseudoephedrine would be used to 
manufacture methamphetamine.
135 
The proposed language of the pharmacist protection statute eliminates 
the ―reasonable cause to believe‖ standard and imposes strict liability on 
workers who sell pseudoephedrine in excess of the limits imposed by the 
Combat Meth Act,
136
 but American courts have long frowned upon 
statutes that lack mens rea.
137
 The idea that intent is required to perpetrate 
a crime ―is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in 
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal 
individual to choose between good and evil.‖
138
 The Supreme Court ―has 
. . . frequently expressed hostility to interpreting statutes in ways that 
created strict criminal liability,‖ but its hostility has been ―intermittent and 
unpredictable.‖
139
  
 
 
 135. Statute proposed by author [hereinafter, the ―pharmacist protection statute‖]. The proposed 
language would not replace the current pseudoephedrine statute, but rather would apply only to the 
specific category of workers at places of business that are authorized to sell pseudoephedrine. In other 
words, the proposed legislation would not change the current statutory language as it applies to a 
private citizen selling pseudoephedrine to another entity for the purpose of producing 
methamphetamine. The circuit split cited within this Note involves convenience store and pharmacy 
employees who work in places where many legal sales of pseudoephedrine likely occur in any given 
year, as opposed to, for example, individuals buying and selling pseudoephedrine out of their 
basements. 
 136. Strict liability crimes ―do not contain a mens rea requirement regarding one or more elements 
of the actus reus.‖ DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 143. The actus reus is the ―physical or external portion 
of the crime.‖ Id. at 81.  
 137. See id. at 144 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437–38 (1978)).  
 138. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
 139. Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 761 (2002).  
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Despite the longstanding legal principle requiring mens rea to prove 
guilt, over time the Court has recognized that Congress designed some 
statutes to serve as public welfare offenses, whereby it ―impose[d] a form 
of strict criminal liability through statutes that do not require the defendant 
to know the facts that make his conduct illegal.‖
140
 Public welfare offenses 
generally describe offenses as follows: ―(1) public-welfare offenses are not 
derived from the common law; (2) a single violation . . . can 
simultaneously injure a great number of people . . . ; (3) the standard 
imposed . . . is reasonable; (4) the penalty for violation is relatively minor 
. . . ; and (5) conviction rarely damages the reputation of the violator.‖
141
  
In Morissette v. United States, the defendant was convicted of stealing 
used bomb casings from federal property in Michigan, even though he 
allegedly did not intend to steal and thought that the property was 
abandoned.
142
 Affirming Morissette‘s conviction under a public welfare 
statute, the Court noted that ―[m]any violations of such regulations result 
in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create 
the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize.‖
143
 The 
Court added that ―[t]he accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is 
in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably 
expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who 
assumed his responsibilities.‖
144
 
Applying the language of Morissette to pseudoephedrine distribution, 
it is not a stretch of the imagination to conclude that the sale of 
pseudoephedrine to one smurf can cause injury to many people. For 
instance, a superlab is capable of producing at least ten pounds of 
methamphetamine per cycle and more than fifty pounds of toxic waste.
145
 
Assuming for the sake of illustration that the hypothetical addict John 
Meth injects himself with one gram of methamphetamine every two hours 
for forty-eight hours,
146
 he would consume twenty-four grams of 
methamphetamine, which is the equivalent of approximately 0.0529 
 
 
 140. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994). Such ―‗penalties serve as effective means 
of regulation.‘‖ Id. (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280–81 (1943)). 
 141. DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 145. 
 142. 342 U.S. at 247–49. 
 143. Id. at 255–56. 
 144. Id. at 256. 
 145. THREAT 2007, supra note 14, at 8 n.4. See THREAT 2010, supra note 11, at 7 (explaining five 
to seven pounds of toxic waste are generated for each pound of methamphetamine produced). 
 146. This calculation assumes that the superlab produced ten pounds of meth in a production 
cycle. A user of methamphetamine may ―inject as much as a gram of the drug every 2 to 3 hours over 
several days until [the user] run[s] out of meth.‖ Methamphetamine, supra note 7. 
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pounds. A superlab could supply 189 meth addicts with enough 
methamphetamine for the same injection rate and time period as John 
Meth.
147
  
The convenience store or pharmacy worker is ―in a position to prevent‖ 
such injuries from happening.
148
 And, as mentioned above, federal law 
already mandates educational training materials for workers that sell 
pseudoephedrine in order to alert them to legal sale limits.
149
 Therefore, 
convenience store and pharmacy workers occupy a unique position from 
which they can prevent sales of pseudoephedrine above the legal limit, and 
by doing so, they can help prevent injury to the public. 
Although the sale of pseudoephedrine to one methamphetamine 
producer has the potential to harm many people, the proposed pharmacist 
protection statute may be criticized for its five-year prison term. Some 
might argue that five years‘ incarceration is too low.
150
 Others may 
contend that a five-year sentence is not ―relatively small,‖
151
 and therefore 
does not qualify as punishment for a public welfare offense.
152
 
Nevertheless, ―courts have [recently] become more willing to justify strict 
liability, even though incarceration is implicated.‖
153
 For example, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed a one-year incarceration in connection with a strict 
liability offense in United States v. Flum.
154
 The Third Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion in United States v. Engler, in which it noted ―a 
formidable line of cases imposing strict liability in felony cases without 
proof of scienter‖ and ultimately held that a two-year incarceration 
stemming from a strict liability offense was not unconstitutional.
155
 This 
Note proposes a five-year term because ―[t]he constitutionality of acts of 
Congress should not be determined by . . . tight mathematical formulas 
 
 
 147. For the basis of these calculations, see supra notes 7, 14. 
 148. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. 
 149. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 
1290 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Brief of Appellant at 13, Truong, 425 F.3d 1282 (No. 04-5094)) (holding 
that the eponymous defendant could have concluded that purchasers were ―up to no good,‖ even 
though he claimed to have never heard of the word methamphetamine). 
 150. The current maximum punishment under the pseudoephedrine statute is twenty years 
incarceration. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (2006). 
 151. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. 
 152. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.   
 153. DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 145 n.14. 
 154. Id. (citing United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1975)). The defendant Flum 
attempted ―to board an aircraft while having about his person a concealed dangerous and deadly 
weapon.‖ Flum, 518 F.2d at 39. 
 155. United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 433 (3d. Cir. 1986). 
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derived from a pocket calculator or a computer spreadsheet.‖
156
 Of course, 
Congress could tinker with the exact range of incarceration if it feared that 
five years would not stand up to judicial scrutiny.
157
  
Finally, incarceration under the pharmacist protection statute will not 
likely cause damage to the reputation of the offender under the Supreme 
Court‘s rubric. In Morissette, the Court noted that although proof of mens 
rea is usually required for conviction under criminal law, ―[e]xceptions 
came to include sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's actual age 
was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had 
reached age of consent.‖
158
 If the conviction and punishment of a man for 
the rape of a minor is allowed under strict liability, then, a fortiori, strict 
liability for selling pseudoephedrine should also be allowed, as it is hard to 
imagine that a drug conviction would cause worse damage to a person‘s 
reputation than a conviction for a sexual offense.
159
 
Although a public welfare offense makes sense in connection with 
sales of pseudoephedrine in quantities above the legal limits established by 
the Combat Meth Act, it would not be appropriate for sales within the 
legal limits. The hypothetical sales clerk in the earlier example—who 
serves the customer with deteriorating teeth as he purchases one box of 
Sudafed—should not be held strictly liable for the sale, even if a 
reasonable person in his place might have suspected a methamphetamine-
related end use of the product. Punishment for an otherwise legal sale of 
3.6 grams of pseudoephedrine per day and 9 grams per month should be 
 
 
 156. Id. at 434. A five-year maximum sentence was specifically chosen for the pharmacist 
protection statute because a higher sentence would likely trigger serious constitutional concerns that 
the punishment was not ―relatively small,‖ but any lesser sentence might fail to deter would-be 
criminals. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 140. Federal judges are required by statute to 
consider certain factors when determining a defendant‘s sentence (for example, ―to promote respect 
for the law,‖ ―to provide just punishment for the offense,‖ and ―to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct‖). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). A five-year (sixty-month) sentence would likely 
satisfy these considerations, and is relatively close to the current median methamphetamine sentence 
of seventy-two months. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS, at fig.J, http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_ 
Sourcebooks/2009/figj.pdf. 
 157. For example, Congress could choose to impose two years‘ incarceration since that has 
already been deemed constitutional for a public welfare offense. See Engler, 806 F.2d at 433. 
 158. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.8 (1952).   
 159. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and 
Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1202 (1999) 
(―Having one's criminal sexual offense history made public and being labeled a ‗repetitive sex 
offender,‘ or the like, plainly calls into question one's ‗good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.‘ 
Indeed, being labeled an ‗active shoplifter,‘ . . . or an alleged alcoholic . . . pales in comparison, given 
society's acute disdain for sex offenders, as manifest in the repeated acts of vigilantism experienced by 
registrants subject to community notification.‖ (footnote omitted)).   
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reserved only for those workers who have actual knowledge of 
methamphetamine production linked to the sale. Enough judicial resources 
have already been spent on the question of what constitutes a ―reasonable 
cause to believe,‖ and courts are still split as to its proper meaning.
160
  
From a policy perspective, pharmacy and convenience store workers 
should not have to worry about whether a sale of pseudoephedrine within 
the legal limits of the Combat Meth Act constitutes a violation of the 
pseudoephedrine statute. It would be unreasonable to ask workers to act as 
de facto judges each time they make a small sale of pseudoephedrine 
product, whereby they are evaluated by courts in hindsight as to whether 
the customer had given any signs that a reasonable worker should 
understand as indicating that methamphetamine production would result 
from the sale.
161
 Therefore, the pharmacist protection statute imposes no 
liability in such situations, unless the worker had ―actual knowledge that 
the pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.‖
162
 
This standard will likely mean that very few prosecutions will ever occur 
from sales within the legal limits imposed by the Combat Meth Act, but 
the standard will allow the worker to function as a sales clerk and not a 
judge, while still allowing for prosecution in the most egregious cases.
163
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, methamphetamine production and addiction will likely 
continue no matter how precisely Congress chooses its statutory language. 
In order to make the war on meth more effective and reduce confusion 
among the federal circuit courts, Congress should remove the ―reasonable 
cause to believe‖ language from the pseudoephedrine statute and impose 
strict liability upon sales clerks who sell pseudoephedrine above the legal 
limits prescribed by the Combat Meth Act. Although the Supreme Court 
may eventually choose to resolve the circuit split, so long as ―reasonable 
cause to believe‖ remains in the statute, pharmacy and convenience store 
workers with no knowledge of a customer‘s criminal intent could face 
criminal liability for selling pseudoephedrine within otherwise legal 
 
 
 160. See supra Part II. 
 161. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (―The ‗reasonableness‘ of a particular 
use of force [by police] must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.‖). 
 162. Pharmacist protection statute, supra text accompanying note 135. 
 163. For example, a sales clerk could still be prosecuted for selling a box of Sudafed to a customer 
after learning from the customer that he intends to produce methamphetamine from the product. 
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164
 The proposed revisions to the pseudoephedrine statute would 
protect pharmacists and convenience store employees from the possibility 
of criminal prosecution when they sell pseudoephedrine within the limits 
prescribed by the Combat Meth Act and have no knowledge of the 
customer‘s intent to engage in methamphetamine production. Congress 
should rewrite the pseudoephedrine statute in order to resolve conflicting 
interpretations of scienter among the courts of appeals, adapt to changing 
methamphetamine production technologies, and deter sales of illegal 
quantities of pseudoephedrine as defined by the Combat Meth Act.  
Raphael S. Nemes
 
 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 129–32. 
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